Humanitarianism and Mutual Aid in a Globalized World

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Abstract

The world is changing drastically due to globalization, and the nature, scope, and importance of these changes are the subject of intense public discussion. Conflicting theories on the factors and mechanisms influencing humanitarianism and mutual aid are at the heart of this discussion. An ideology known as humanitarianism places a high value on human life. It maintains that, for moral, altruistic, and emotional reasons, individuals should treat others with kindness, work to alleviate suffering, and improve human circumstances. Although humanitarianism at the local and national levels has a long history, specialists in international politics typically trace the rise of global humanitarian impulses back to the 1800s. Establishing the International Red Cross in 1863 is seen as a watershed in the global history of humanitarianism. The scope of humanitarianism has expanded along with changing conceptions of what makes a "human" and whose life is important. This paper is about global humanitarian assistance. It discusses the relationship between humanitarian theory's tenets and humanitarian emergency assistance procedures. It examines some of the most important moral dilemmas that face anybody trying to apply humanitarian principles in the field. This paper investigates the concept of humanitarianism. It also examines how this philosophy is reflected in the fundamental beliefs of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Lastly, some thoughts on humanitarianism's place in the field of international ethics round up the discussion.

Keywords: Humanitarianism, Humanitarian Assistance, Humanity, International Committee of the Red Cross, Ethics, Mutual Aid

Introduction

In every way, humanitarianism has grown more intricate. Numerous developments have occurred since the end of the Cold War: a rise in humanitarian activity, a multiplicity of humanitarian actors and their duties (military forces serving as both relief and development actors, for example), the professionalization of relief aid, etc. To put it simply, those days are long gone when the sole humanitarian players were the Red Cross and States, and when emergency circumstances were adequately covered by international humanitarian law alone. The gradual adjustment of regional and international (humanitarian) legislation followed all these changes. A coherent body of law is still far from existing, as evidenced by the

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFCR) building a corpus of cases, legal case studies, and legal documents pertinent to emergencies—what is known as international disaster response law. The legal framework of international law concerning emergency response is widely dispersed throughout several international legal domains and associated documentation. First of all, humanitarian aid is not covered by international humanitarian law (IHL), which exclusively addresses armed conflicts and not just natural catastrophes.

At least since the mid-1800s, the narrative of humanitarian aid has spread throughout the world and has come to symbolize redemption. These days, this is summed up in the term "humanitarianism," where the "ism" suffix covers a wide spectrum of attitudes, actions, categories, conversations, and conventions that, although flexible and subject to sudden changes, may be recognized as "humanitarian." Humanity is manifested in a variety of deeds, movements, and ethical systems that differ in their application and articulation but are united in their high purposes. While these objectives are based on core humanitarian principles such as "neutrality," "independence," "humanity," and "impartiality," they also characterize a modern redemptory mentality that is expressed in deeds of compassion and governance. Rather than being a reaction to a catastrophe, humanitarianism is a complex, multi-scale network of many actors, politics, and institutions. It's an intervention modality (to improve the world), a global ethos driven by the need to provide for human needs amid extraordinary, unequal, or imbalanced circumstances. Its history is intertwined with ideas and deeds associated with liberation and redemption, rendering it a consistent and noteworthy feature of modernity (De Lauri 2020).

This paper discusses the philosophical and moral underpinnings of humanitarianism as well as the ethical issues with both the notion and the practice. Humanitarianism is one of the first and most successful cosmopolitan concepts to be used and codified in the international system. This discourse encompasses the history and definition of humanitarianism, its connection to cosmopolitanism, the ethical dilemmas that contemporary humanitarian actors encounter, and the limitations of humanitarianism as a paradigm for global ethics. The argument that some of the challenges faced by aid organizations and other actors are a result of the humanitarian imperative's conceptualization as a concept of both justice and charity, the relationship between humanitarian theory and practice, and the idea of rights and the evolving humanitarian imperative doctrine are also covered.

In contemporary English, the word "humanitarianism" currently has several meanings. It includes anything from immediate aid for the effects of natural disasters and conflicts to long-term development support, military assistance, and armed involvement. Three ways that humanitarianism appears on the international scene, according to Ramsbottom and Woodhouse, are (i) the international humanitarian law of armed conflict; (ii) the group of

actions referred to as "international humanitarian assistance"; and (iii) what some call "international human rights law" (1996: 10).

Lately, there has been a tangible and symbolic assault on humanity. This is especially true in cases when humanitarian help is being provided during an emergency, as there is a real possibility that it might incite conflict rather than alleviate suffering. Humanitarianism places a higher priority on positive duties to assist others than on negative duties to abstain from or stop harming others. To put it simply, it involves "the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate danger of harm" (Barnett 2015: 724). Humanitarianism emphasizes the tension between consequentialist and deontological norms. The challenges of humanitarian relief bring with them the age-old moral dilemma of how to preserve core principles while taking the unintended consequences of choices into account. The ethics of humanitarianism are a controversial subject in the domains of international ethics and international relations practice because of these elements, which have created a divide between "classical" and "new" humanitarianism.

The universalist principle that all individuals have a right to help in times of need and that we must offer such help to prevent or diminish needless suffering is the foundation of humanitarianism. As the former head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Cornelio Sommaruga (1999: 27) put it, the universality and independence of humanitarian action "transcends national and political considerations to focus on the human conditions [and] reflects the universality of suffering." As a result, humanitarianism emphasizes the cosmopolitan objective of putting an end to suffering as well as the notion that a person's affiliation with a specific group within the human family shouldn't prevent them from receiving aid to leave that situation and put an end to their suffering when they experience extreme poverty, hunger, disease, or other preventable harms.

The central claim of this argument is the cosmopolitan thesis, which holds that humans should be treated like other animals since we share morally significant characteristics with them. This suggests that no human being should be free from moral concern when it comes to having their needs satisfied. Humanitarianism is one of the core cosmopolitan principles, if not the fundamental one since it bases its moral claims on the idea of "humanity." Humanitarianism is a cosmopolitan ideal since it centers moral concern on all individuals. Humanitarianism has been founded on an understanding of the fundamental cosmopolitan principles of impartiality, individuality, and universality as well as neutrality and consent.

More evidence for the altruistic principles found in anti-cosmopolitan traditions comes from the concept of mutual aid, sometimes referred to as good samaritanism—the obligation to assist those in need without putting oneself at risk. Walzer, Miller, and Rawls all advocate for mutual aid in dire circumstances (De Lauri 2020). This suggests that anti-cosmopolitans generally are in favor of humanitarianism as a theory and a way of life, at least in its more subdued manifestations. Given the agreement between cosmopolitanism and anti-

cosmopolitanism, the most crucial question—and the domain in which they differ—is the scope of the duty of assistance. Put another way, how much of a sacrifice should one person make to help another? But anti-cosmopolitans have nothing to say about how humanitarianism—the moral value placed on helping one's fellow citizens—can be implemented. Just admitting that those in need are the reason for aid does not solve the ethical conundrum. Once aid is provided, several political and ethical considerations make further considerations on the definition, purpose, and most effective means of achieving it necessary.

Four crucial areas of humanitarianism are identified in the contemporary era of global interconnectedness: humanitarian borders, education in times of crisis, humanitarian diplomacy, and the concept of civil society in humanitarianism.

Humanitarianism and Borders: Proponents of globalization, whether they are large corporations or charitable organizations, have adopted the slogan "a world without borders." The widespread erection of walls and barriers, however, does not conflict with globalized flows or transnational discourses. Rather, they illustrate what Ritaine (2019) terms the "fault lines of globalization," which are built both in opposition to and alongside these discourses and flows. Apart from exacerbating inequality, walls, and fences signify the validation of a select few privileged individuals who, using *teichopolitics* – the politics of constructing barriers – genuinely fulfill the potential of globalization and safeguard its benefits (Rosiere and Jones 2012). Furthermore, *domopolitics*—the theory that the state is structured like a house—shapes border barriers (Walters 2014). Put differently, walls function as actual boundaries that give birth to concepts of security and residence. They also reveal disputed claims to sovereignty and power. Artificial borders and naturally existing limits (such as a desert or sea) function as weapons of surveillance and deterrent during times of crisis, creating periods of privilege and division (between those who can cross a border and those who cannot).

The public is now concerned about borders because the so-called Western democracies are unable to control refugee and migrant flows or stop terrorism. The crisis has not only exacerbated security measures but has also provided philosophical and political justification for the delineation of humanitarian borders as locations where rescue and aid efforts have coexisted with opposition and enforcement. For example, the 2015 immigrant reception crisis revealed the shortcomings of Europe's asylum system and its broader architecture, but it also showed how the narrative of "rescue" was used to disguise interdiction as a morally competent border administration strategy (Moreno-Lax 2018). The safety of migrants on the ground is still at risk due to policies that militarize and securitize borders more and more (Williams 2016).

Though this idea may appear paradoxical at first, William Walters (2010) is commended for offering a convincing explanation of the humanitarian border. Modern humanitarianism is

frequently defined as a force that crosses national and international boundaries to protect humanity when it is in danger. According to Walters, it would be incorrect to draw a direct link between humanitarian efforts and deterritorialization reasoning. The application of humanitarian authority is intrinsically tied to the establishment of new places, even though humanitarian activities may draw attention to certain statehood norms. By redefining certain territories as "humanitarian zones," humanitarianism actualizes a new geography of spaces that materializes in a variety of contexts, such as conflict areas, famine-affected areas, failed or fragile states, or situations where the actual borders of states and gateways to national territories become zones of humanitarian government (Walters 2010: 139). This issue still exists at several borders in Europe, the US, the Middle East, Australia, and Africa. The humanitarianization of borders as places affected by major crises, for instance, is a new chapter in the history of European borders, as seen by the growth of border fences, holding facilities, and shelters throughout Europe, along with increased border patrols, maritime surveillance, and deportations.

The goal of border control has historically been to preserve state sovereignty over exclusive territorial regions by controlling who and what is allowed to cross state borders or enter and exit exclusive state territory. To do this, border control has approved methods ranging from physical force used by border police officers to restrictions and denials of mobility, which constitute forms of violence (De Lauri 2019a). The politics of bordering—assisting refugees and migrants in their "home countries"—have increasingly intertwined with practices of imprisonment as humanitarian borders have grown in popularity. As a result, policies of rejection and the externalization of European borders have been presented as acts of humanitarian control in the face of crises and uncertainty. As a result, humanitarian responses to border crises and migrant and refugee catastrophes have included fencing off areas, increasing the reach of immigration receiving facilities, and patrolling beaches. The current dynamic that humanitarian militarism globally has best embodied for decades—the overlap of rescue and global policing—is reproduced on European territory by the reciprocal relationship between humanitarian search-and-rescue operations and state performances on European borders (De Lauri 2019b). It is possible to identify the emergence of a transnational discourse of compassionate border security that blends the humanitarian impulse with policing and militarization, reshaping traditional territorially based understandings of borders, despite the diversity of geographical, historical, and cultural contexts characterizing today's humanitarian borders globally (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017).

Humanitarianism and Education: In post-conflict and post-disaster environments, national authorities, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations must provide access to education for children who have been affected by limited mobility, rising levels of insecurity, insufficient infrastructure and/or skilled labor, family loss, and reduced

livelihood opportunities. Schools are not shielded from direct assault during an armed conflict. For example, they could be the only permanent structures in a remote area, making them very susceptible to theft, bombing, and destruction. Local teachers may also become easy targets since they are well-liked by the community, hold strong political views, and are the sole representatives of the government in a far-flung hamlet. The destruction of educational networks is one of the greatest setbacks to democracy for countries afflicted by violence. Rebuilding lost professional and foundational knowledge can take years, making the process of healing after a disagreement extremely difficult (Aguilar and Retamal 2009). In essence, the 1989 Convention on Rights of the Child mandates that "State parties [must] take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict," in addition to "making primary education available and compulsory without limitation."

Due to the large number of children impacted by natural disasters and armed conflicts, education in crises has grown in importance as an area of expertise and humanitarian aid. Emergency project education is frequently a component of a bigger initiative that promotes social transformation and community resilience.

While it is legal for children of displaced refugees to attend conventional schools in their host countries, in reality, relatively few can do so. Certain host countries decline to offer educational opportunities to refugee children or to let humanitarian organizations do so (Aguilar and Retamal 2019). In times of emergency, continuing education can be provided through transitional home-based learning, support in local schools and camps, or double schooling (Kirk and Winthrop 2017). It is important to consider the entire educational cycle, from helping families to school reconstruction, to safeguard children's right to an education during catastrophes. Education providers need to think about how to (re)integrate schools into wider institutional contexts of society and how to rebuild trust by providing access to the educational "ladder." Additionally, it's critical to instill values and life skills related to gender equality, environmental awareness, responsible citizenship, and health, as well as to safeguard vulnerable groups including minorities, children with impairments, and teenagers who are not in school (Sinclair 2017).

Although many settings have procedures and agreements in place to ensure that students have access to education, they often do not guarantee the quality of the teaching and learning process as well as the effectiveness of the education response (Gallano 2018). Bottom-up participatory reviews of education programs aim to identify the challenges related to information production, upholding a child-centered perspective, and overseeing a complex emergency schedule (Maclure 2016). In addition to formal education, the latter proposes observing and considering informal educational processes, which might be significant in society, especially in times of conflict (Anderson and Mendenhall 2016).

Humanitarian Diplomacy: Ensuring continuous access to help during times of war and complicated catastrophes has long been a top priority for humanitarian actors and governments. Therefore, to provide civilian access, aid, and safety, humanitarian discussions have historically been held in very insecure political environments (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot 2014; Pease 2016). The idea of humanitarian diplomacy emerged from the implicit, and occasionally even hidden, practices of humanitarian negotiations (Magone, Neuman, and Weissman 2011). While the term had been used before, it became more widely used in the early 2000s. Persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interests of vulnerable people and with complete regard for fundamental humanitarian values is the general definition of humanitarian diplomacy. It includes actions taken by humanitarian actors to secure from governmental and military authorities a space in which they may operate honorably. These tasks include securing the entry of humanitarian organizations into a nation, negotiating access for civilian populations in need of protection and aid, overseeing aid initiatives, encouraging adherence to international law and norms, and participating in various forms of advocacy in support of humanitarian goals (Minear and Smith 2017). Humanitarian diplomacy is seen in this context as a way to assist those who are most in need. The promise to "leave no one behind" has been a central component of discussions surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals, and there is a developing political consensus that putting this goal into practice is an essential component of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, which was released by the United Nations (UN). Nonetheless, there is a notable conflict inherent in humanitarian diplomacy. Humanitarianism is about supporting and assisting those in need, whereas diplomacy is mostly about representing one political entity against another. Thus, the public perception of humanitarian action—which frequently deviates from actual events—is that of something that is about working toward ideals and universal principles regardless of the interests of particular political actors. In contrast, diplomacy is defined by compromise and practical dealings.

Scholars have mostly refuted the apolitical perspective taken by certain practitioners of humanitarianism, pointing out that humanitarianism cannot be understood apart from its operational settings, which are inherently political and embedded in a range of diplomatic activities. From an analytical perspective, comprehending humanitarian diplomacy via its practices makes it easier to conceptualize the activity within the context of the larger pluralization of diplomacy (Turunen 2020). Diplomatic procedures are indeed used and conceptualized in ways that go much beyond the boundaries of the Westphalian state order. A comprehension of diplomacy limited to its conventional definition, which is monopolized by nations and international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union, falls short of accurately representing the realities of contemporary diplomatic practices and infrastructures. The notion that diplomacy is limited to statecraft and sovereignty is false and

misleading. Global issues like conflicts, natural disasters, and refugee flows are too complicated to be reduced to the concerns of state players, which classical diplomacy might address (Turunen 2020: 465). According to Constantinou (2013) and Turunen (2020), diplomacy is a pluralistic endeavor that takes place within networks of many players with a variety of identities, interests, and perspectives on the world, how it functions, and how it should be.

Different perspectives and methods of humanitarian diplomacy are produced by the multiplicity of humanitarian players engaged in intricate catastrophes as well as their conflicting aims and objectives. As varied as the number of organizations (or nations) who use the phrase and the humanitarian operations they conduct are its meanings and perceived content. The concept of humanitarian diplomacy, the use of the phrase, and the attainment of international consensus over its definition and appropriate practices varies greatly (Régnier 2011).

The protected places that humanitarian assistance is designed to offer are increasingly being targeted by parties involved in the war, as seen by the huge humanitarian disasters that have occurred in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. As a result, a large number of individuals are either compelled to travel along routes where humanitarians have little to no access or are caught in conflicts that place them at significant danger of being exploited by traffickers. Conflict zones and protracted crises where civilian populations are the intended victims, access is difficult, aid workers run the risk of being seen as a threat or a kidnapping target, and their physical safety is in doubt are the reasons behind the dangers that humanitarianism faces (Barnett and Weiss 2018). The ability of humanitarian actors to get help is being called into question in ways that alter their role and diplomatic capabilities. According to De Lauri (2018), the nature of violent conflicts is evolving, and the politicization of assistance access has turned into a fundamental aspect of the war.

Humanitarianism and Civil Society: Cicero's theory of *societas civilis*, which in turn developed Aristotle's concept of *koinonia politike* (political community), is where the idea of civil society first emerged. The term's present usage, which describes a complex web of relationships, communities, networks, and groups standing between the individual and the modern state, is closely related to modern European philosophy (Kenny 2017). It is widely recognized as the "third sector" of society, apart from the government and the marketplace. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines civil society as the space where people come together to take collective action in support of shared goals, beliefs, and interests. The lines that separate civil society's institutional forms from those of the state, family, and market are usually drawn, but they are always disputed and muddled. The locations, actors, and institutional structures that make up civil society differ in terms of formality, autonomy, and power. According to WHO (2017), civil society comprises groups like business associations, coalitions, advocacy groups, women's organizations, registered charities,

nongovernmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, and business associations. The UN believes that collaborations with civil society are essential to furthering the organization's goals and assisting with its operations. This viewpoint, meantime, is indicative of the humanitarian sector's overall inclination to use the term "civil society" loosely. The idea of civil society is frequently mobilized by foreign humanitarian actors as a means of gaining legitimacy rather than to strengthen local ownership, even if it is seen to be strategically important when carrying out grounded interventions via local partners.

Since the 1990s, the "third sector" has experienced considerable growth. A broad crisis in the state's ability to provide welfare and protection, the expansion of organized private and voluntary actors due to new information and communication channels, and the effects of neoliberalism were all major factors in what many called the global associational revolution of the aid industry (Salamon et al. 1999). The concept of a global civil society has grown and solidified quickly, but even so, there is still some ambiguity surrounding it, leading one to wonder what constitutes a proper definition and how it has been applied in different contexts and at different times (Foley and Edwards 1996). For instance, civil society has been utilized to advance democracy and human rights in vulnerable governments as well as political and economic transition in formerly communist nations (Roy 2015). Critiques also highlight how official donor government policies that repress populations are reinforced by global civil society, which is progressively moving away from universal rights (Pupavac 2015).

A crucial inquiry is also whether it is useful to differentiate between civil and political society since various groups within civil society—ranging from religious organizations to interest groups—are incessantly organized for political purposes. A strict division between political and civil organizations can be deceptive. Consequently, the concept of civil society is inherently ambiguous, failing to clarify the point at which civil becomes political (Foley and Edwards 1996). Aside from semantics, some regard civil society, or global civil society, as a humanitarian actor in and of itself, which is necessary to assert a claim to humanitarian assistance (Miglinaité 2015); others, however, are dubious of the term's universalistic qualities, particularly given its tendency to obscure the objectives and roles of various social groups, organizations, and other collectives involved in humanitarian settings.

This paper investigates the relationship between the application of humanitarian emergency relief and the principles of humanitarian theory. Examined are the most important moral dilemmas that face those trying to apply humanitarian principles in the field. This paper investigates the concept of humanitarianism. It also examines how the core beliefs of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) reflect this ideology. It concludes with some thoughts on the place of humanitarianism within the framework of international ethics.

The Historical Development of Humanitarianism

Following the economic unrest of the Industrial Revolution in England, social changes in the late 1800s and early 1900s demonstrated humanity to the general public. In addition to advocating for feminism in the 1900s, many British women also supported humanitarianism. Humanitarians put pressure on Parliament to make it unlawful for minors and unskilled people to work in such horrible hours and circumstances. During the Industrial Revolution, some of the most important humanitarian laws approved by Parliament were the Factory Acts of 1833 and 1844.

Humanitarianism played a major role in the mid-1800s emergency response work of Florence Nightingale and Henry Dunant, the latter of whom went on to form the Red Cross. Henry S. Salt founded the Humanitarian League (1891–1919), an English lobbying organization whose goal was to further humanitarian causes.

The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1814) marked the beginning of humanitarianism in times of conflict. During the later conflict, the Duke of Wellington learned to appreciate his surgeons for their capacity to maintain military personnel, enabling men to recuperate and rejoin the battlefield more rapidly. Wellington was fighting in the Iberian Peninsula with a lesser force than his opponent. The military Surgeon General, Sir James McGrigor, was inspired by this experience to instill a new level of professionalism in military medicine. As a result, *The Army Medical Officer's Manual Upon Active Service* was published in 1819. The Manual, which covered everything from setting up camp to supplying ambulances, was designed to serve as a reference for surgeons serving in future wars when the people who had firsthand experience with the war in the Peninsula were no longer available to provide advice. Despite the Manual, these lessons had been forgotten by the time of the Crimean War due to forty years of peace and military economy.

When Swiss industrialist Henri Dunant witnessed the complete disregard for injured soldiers during the Second Italian War of Independence's battle of Solferino (1859) by both the Austrian and Italian leadership, a new vein of humanitarianism was born. This gave rise to his concept for the Red Cross, which quickly spread over the world and gave rise to national organizations with the mission of caring for ill and injured troops. The first Geneva Convention (1864), which provided protection for sick and injured soldiers as well as civilians in battle areas, was also made possible thanks in part to Dunant.

In World War I (1914–1918), humanitarianism underwent still another evolution as the role of neutral, non-combatant nations in distributing humanitarian aid became clear. Armies on both sides of the battle received massive supplies of sera (a vaccination that protects against, for example, tetanus) and much-needed vaccines from the Danish State Serum Institute. Its

director, Thorvald Madsen, was involved in addressing the appalling circumstances found in Russia's prisoner-of-war camps in collaboration with the Russian Red Cross.

There are several theories on discrete epochs of humanitarianism, based on the geopolitical or socioeconomic variables that influence humanitarian intervention. Michael Barnett's proposal to divide humanitarianism into three eras—"imperial humanitarianism" (late 19th century to 1945), "neo-humanitarianism" (1945–1989), and "liberal humanitarianism" (post-1990)—is an example of the first method. The proponents of the socioeconomic and cultural approach, Norbert Götz, Georgina Brewis, and Steffen Werther, contend that there have been periods of "ad hoc humanitarianism" (before to around 1900), "organized humanitarianism" (between 1900 and 1970), and "expressive humanitarianism" (after 1970). They speculate that we may be approaching "a novel kind of defensive humanitarianism with thick 'firewalls' between donors and recipients, automated interfaces, and roots in the expressive age." However, it is typically challenging to create a clear distinction between the donor and the beneficiary. The use of "local staff," the proactive requests for assistance from those in need, and the growth of neighborhood humanitarian groups all point to a close relationship between the giver and the recipient.

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, took place between 1967 and 1970 and was the first famine to be shown on television. It caused a hunger crisis and humanitarian disaster in the breakaway State of Biafra. Radicalized medical professionals, the propaganda-savvy Biafran leadership, and Irish Catholic missionaries with a long-standing and shamelessly politicized local presence all combined to inspire extraordinary individual donations from the public throughout Europe and North America. Within the beleaguered and fast-dwindling Biafran area, these NGOs organized a mass food distribution campaign and organized an assistance airlift. The relief program's popularity and its ability to stir up public and humanitarian opinion were largely due to its reliance on missionary administrative networks that were already in place, as well as its willingness to use partisan arguments and new media technologies that made filming and broadcasting easier.

These networks and techniques evolved into a new, politically charged, cutting-edge, and distinctly non-governmental humanitarian grammar. The structure of humanitarian operations was likewise revolutionized by the Biafran assistance effort. Humanitarians were accused of having encouraged the Biafran regime's existence to prolong the struggle; in fact, many of the accusations made against non-governmental humanitarian activities are based on criticism of the Biafra program. It has had a significant influence on the humanitarian scene of today as it served as the model for the activist humanitarianism and crisis response models adopted by MSF and Concern Worldwide.

Every significant crisis has been essential in strengthening the humanitarian system's constituent parts. Humanitarian organizations began developing guidelines and medium-term plans in the 1980s near the Khmer-Thai border to help the lives of Khmer refugees

from the Pol Pot government. The genocide in Rwanda, which occurred between April and July of 1994, served as a stark reminder of the interdependence of politics and humanitarian action, as well as the value of accountability and assessment. The war in Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s brought to light the little influence that humanitarian organizations have when strong political choices are lacking. Ultimately, recent instances of natural catastrophes occurring in the absence of conflict—such as the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the Japanese tsunami in 2011—were crucial in demonstrating that the magnitude of these events is beyond the capacity of humanitarian aid currently available.

Throughout history, humanitarian operations have changed from being managed by governments and almost exclusively centered on the health and welfare of armed forces to providing protection and care for all civilians harmed by conflict and possessing a more robust philanthropic and political purpose. Academics, governments, charitable organizations, and the general public all have different perspectives on humanitarian operations with every new conflict or catastrophe. To effectively assist individuals who are living in war now and in the future, it is critical to consider and learn from the achievements and difficulties of humanitarianism in previous conflicts.

Humanitarianism and the Core Principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The main tenets of the ICRC are covered in this section, along with the issues raised by them. The definition and potential of humanitarian action as outlined in the ICRC's tenets have dominated much of the discussion around "new humanitarianism." Consent, neutrality, fairness, and universality are some of these tenets. The majority of humanitarian actors and agencies adhere to these principles or something similar and utilize them as a framework for their work. The ICRC's activities and actions are heavily influenced by these four fundamental ideas. Importantly, they offer the ICRC access to conflict zones and enable it to conduct operations there that would not be possible without them, including combat zones.

Firstly, these concepts bear a striking resemblance to the core tenets of liberal cosmopolitanism. This is no accident; humanitarianism is one way to understand what cosmopolitanism means. Since one's status as a human being and a part of humanity is the sole important factor other than need, one's humanitarian obligation is to alleviate suffering without bias and exclusively by necessity. Because it centers moral concern on the unique humanity of each individual, humanitarianism serves as a fundamental cosmopolitan ideal. The cosmopolitan tenet of humanitarianism holds that all people are entitled to assistance in times of need and that we must provide it. These standards define the just scope of relief work, or beneficence as it is known in Kantian terminology.

Universality

The humanity principle asserts that it is universal, meaning it pertains to every human being. Since everyone is a human being, they should all be considered worthy of assistance during

emergencies. This idea may be used to the practical conclusion that all war victims should be given aid. Additionally, it asserts its universality by claiming validity across cultural boundaries. The principles of suffering cannot be overridden by any claim to cultural diversity, and the majority of civilizations assert that they acknowledge some kind of human ideal that includes the desire to end needless suffering. The ICRC cites the nearly universal adherence of all governments to the Geneva Conventions, which enshrine this idea, as evidence in favor of this assertion. By this commitment, all governments at least in theory recognize that all people are entitled to relief from suffering during times of conflict and that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a legal organization with the power to provide humanitarian help. Recent years have seen a lack of practical demonstration of this commitment by many nations and certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); an example of this would be their failure or refusal to assist the Serbian victims of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign (see Fox 2011).

Neutrality

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines neutrality as their non-political operations, meaning they do not advocate for or against any side in a conflict or the actions of its parties. Humanitarian actors that maintain their neutrality refrain from engaging in realpolitik or party politics. Stated differently, they are not involved in the dispute. Since this concept of neutrality relates to not choosing sides, it is best described as non-partisan rather than non-political. The value of neutrality to organizations that provide humanitarian relief aid cannot be overstated. Aid organizations must seem to be outside parties to the conflict to gain entry to unstable areas. Admitting the humanitarians inside the war area reassures the fighters that they are not providing solace or assistance to their adversaries. Neutrality is comparable to apathy in the origins and consequences of the conflict in this sense.

In the perspective of humanitarianism, neutrality has been questioned on at least two occasions. The first accusation is that remaining neutral might equate to being unresponsive to or indifferent to the political factors that fuel conflict and bloodshed. To provide care for some of the victims, neutrality has forced the ICRC to keep quiet about what is causing them misery. According to the critics, neutrality now equates to being apathetic, disingenuous, and inconsistent (Slim 1997: 347). It follows that humanitarians must identify and be able to evaluate the political climates in which they work, as well as take a position on these issues. NGOs with a specific focus on social justice or human rights have made these critiques. These organizations are unable to advocate on behalf of the victims because of their neutrality. The opponents contend that in some cases, neutrality must be given up to "bear witness" to suffering and to name those who are causing it. In the worst-case scenario, this might imply that an organization needs to risk being denied entry or withdraw from a war

situation, as Medicines Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has occasionally done.

The ICRC's actions during the Nazi Holocaust are perhaps the clearest example of how neutrality may be damaging in this situation. In this case, the ICRC's access to prisoners of war and internally displaced peoples was made possible by the rules of neutrality, which obliged them to ignore the state policies that specifically targeted Jews and other minorities for forced labor and genocide (Favez 1999). The ICRC adopted the stance that making comments on the Holocaust would amount to political interference or criticism of official action since neutrality in politics meant not taking sides.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) uses the claim that it is non-political and does not take sides to get access to victims or those in need. In terms of the language and problems of the war, it is unbiased. Neutrality is more difficult to uphold, nevertheless, when the population is the target, when help is directed towards an adversary, or when it is seen as such. Giving humanitarian supplies to a town that may be besieged by hostile troops might be interpreted as contributing to and extending the siege, as well as the misery that goes along with it. Another way to look at this kind of assistance is as feeding people, and then releasing them so the adversary may kill them. This is the contention on the alleged safe havens established by the UN in Yugoslavia. The slaughter of the male Muslim residents of Srebrenica was perceived as UN complicity due to their negligence. In addition, particularly in these circumstances, giving the ICRC access can be used by those who commit violent crimes to demonstrate their purported humanitarian credentials while continuing their destructive activities, as was the case with Nazi Germany when it permitted the ICRC to visit the Theresienstadt concentration camp. Thus, the moral conundrum facing aid organizations is whether continuing to remain impartial is adding to the issue or if giving up on neutrality will put them at risk of being unable to provide aid or relief.

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), an organization created specifically to address some of the shortcomings of ICRC policies, has been at the forefront of confronting and disputing the organization on these concerns as well as its neutrality policy. MSF is best understood as an adaptation and correction of these instances, even if it is sometimes presented as a total rejection of the ICRC principles. MSF supports the concept of "care and bear witness," which might involve activism, speaking out, and lobbying, over the ideal of complete neutrality. To guarantee that emergency relief is provided only based on necessities, neutrality must be viewed as a moral ideal with a purpose, not as apathy or a lack of principles.

It is important to remember that political neutrality, such as that of Switzerland, differs from humanitarian neutrality. Switzerland's political neutrality enables all parties to utilize the country for their ends and permits Switzerland to interact with all parties in a way that is advantageous to Switzerland. Humanitarian neutrality, according to Slim (1997: 347), entails

impartiality, prevention, and abstention. To put it another way, neutrality means that "neither party can use the organization to its advantage" and that "nothing is involved in the political or military conflict." It also means that all parties are treated equally. The kind of interactions that an NGO can have with parties involved in a conflict are limited by its humanitarian neutrality.

In complicated catastrophes, it is intrinsically difficult to maintain the impartiality required by humanitarianism. One must make tough decisions about whether aid is benefiting or harming one side or both, as well as if it is reaching its intended targets. Retaining neutrality is not a straightforward technological matter that can be determined beforehand. However, the concept is not always compromised by the challenges involved in making these choices. It indicates that the principle's application—that is, how it is interpreted and used—is what determines whether it is morally or ethically right, just like all other rules. In recent times, the concept of integrated or cohesive humanitarianism has successfully abandoned the neutrality principle and moved past just bearing witness to actively adopting a stance. It is said that neutrality has impeded more fundamental changes that call for tackling political concerns like human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Impartiality

Impartiality is the third ICRC principle, which states that victims of both sides of a conflict have a right to humanitarian aid. Although impartiality is sometimes mistaken for neutrality, impartiality is the act of not discriminating against innocent parties as well as aggressors and defenders. It is about who is going to get the help. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) aims to safeguard all parties harmed by conflict as long as they are no longer engaged in hostilities. It is based on this fundamental tenet. People are entitled to humanitarian aid on the same terms as everyone else after they cease to be fighters. To remain impartial, the ICRC "endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals being guided solely by their need and to give priority to the most urgent cases," as stated by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996: 16). According to the concept of impartiality, every person has the same right to equitable treatment and the satisfaction of their requirements in terms of their welfare and the reduction of suffering, regardless of where they were born. Hugo Slim notes that a lot of people who oppose neutrality also support impartiality. For example, MSF has placed a strong emphasis on impartiality since it enables them to pass judgment. Stated differently, "people or groups will face public criticism based on their actions rather than their identity" (Slim 1997: 349). This concept of objectivity fits in better with the liberal-cosmopolitan idea of a viewpoint that can evaluate and judge from the outside in.

However, impartiality has also been criticized. Impartiality has been deemed difficult in the context of the refugee camps established to house individuals escaping the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. According to Fox (2011), impartiality in this context meant that the UN and other humanitarian organizations frequently gave help to the genocide criminals and permitted

them to carry out their crimes inside the refugee camps themselves. This was because among the refugees were both Hutus and Tutsis who were trying to escape the invading Tutsi army that was attempting to put an end to the Holocaust. Due to the principle of fairness, all refugees were admitted into the camps, making it difficult to distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis, let alone between the offenders and the victims, due to the sheer volume of people. Many humanitarians had a moral crisis as a result of the Rwandan incident, which led to the creation of a new code of conduct for NGOs involved in disaster relief efforts as well as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

In similar situations in the past, MSF has been prepared to leave areas where there is no "humanitarian space" and when providing help is genuinely impossible without political meddling. "The ability to independently assess the population's needs; maintain unimpeded access to the population conduct, monitor, and evaluate the distribution of aid commodities; and obtain security guarantees for local and expatriate aid personnel" are all considered to be components of humanitarian space (Tanguy and Terry 1999: 33). In the refugee camps along the Thai–Cambodian border, where MSF was compelled to work with the Khmer Rouge, they saw no such humanitarian space. MSF had to make the painful choice to leave these camps. Since then, MSF has also withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan, citing lack of security for their workers.

The experience of Rwanda makes one wonder if helping former violent individuals who are now refugees is acceptable. According to Martone (2012), the Geneva Conventions, which state that food is a basic right, offer the foundation for the solution. However, this is not the consequentialist question of whether aid is genuinely "funding" human rights abusers. When a perpetrator is suffering and not using violence, impartiality allows help to be provided; nevertheless, if the perpetrator continues to use violence against others, there are legitimate reasons to withhold aid. Complex cost-benefit computations are necessary to make these judgments.

Consent

The fourth principle of the ICRC, consent, also expresses the concepts of impartiality and neutrality. To provide help, the ICRC needs the warring parties' permission. It is obvious that this is a practical move intended to facilitate their work and access, but it also serves as a tool for holding warring parties accountable because they must acknowledge humanitarian values and international agreements (ICRC). Nevertheless, the detractors also contend that obtaining consent would restrict access, making aid impossible. On the other hand, it's feasible that the cost of getting permission, remaining silent, or even agreeing to make agreements with warlords and other such parties will be too great and will defeat the initial goal of supporting the ongoing war effort.

Even while others, like Doctors Without Borders (MSF), have criticized the ICRC for being a model of humanitarian work, they are still primarily dedicated to the same kind of endeavor. The majority of humanitarian NGOs adopt the ICRC's basic principles but give them a unique interpretation. Several organizations have attempted, for instance, to go beyond dispute and define and expand the meaning of fundamental humanitarian principles more thoroughly through the Sphere Project and the Humanitarian Charter. They are an attempt to rethink and expand upon the fundamental objectives of humanitarianism as outlined by the ICRC, rather than reject them.

But in the modern day, discussions concerning the morality of humanitarianism and the practical provision of aid center around the four guiding principles of neutrality, universality, impartiality, and consent. Complex situations have been shown to pose the greatest threat to neutrality.

Humanitarianism in Theory and Practice

The volume and range of requests for humanitarian aid have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War. As many observers pointed out, humanitarianism during the Cold War was mostly restricted to the Red Cross's activities in situations involving natural catastrophes. However, since at least the 1990s, there have been an increasing number of situations requiring or requesting humanitarian help and relief, as well as an increasing number of organizations engaged in this type of work. Most importantly, this has shown that adopting humanitarian values might include considerably more difficult challenges than previously thought. The International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations are now handling "complex emergencies" rather than just helping displaced people or combat zones.

Complex emergencies can be defined as either intrastate or international conflict situations, or as a combination of the two. These circumstances may involve a range of actors, including governments, militias, and international organizations like peacekeeping troops. A combustible blend of state collapse, refugee flight, militias, warrior refugees, and communities in danger from violence, illness, and famine define such complex catastrophes (Barnett 2015: 726). These traits may be seen in Somalia in the 1990s, Sudan/Darfur, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo today. It becomes more difficult to uphold or distinguish between combatants and noncombatants in such circumstances, which is fundamental to conventional humanitarian practice. Furthermore, the targets of the fight are frequently civilians rather than armed units of the opponent. The absence of differentiation between combatants and non-combatants is most evident in instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide, but it is also evident in situations of state collapse, like Somalia, when conflict between warlords or competing militias results in bloodshed. In these situations, governments, militias, criminal gangs, or warlords fight for control over resources, territory, and populations. The fighters frequently see the civilian

populations as appropriate targets for extortion or brutality. Attempting to "represent the values of humanity and peace within societies which are currently dominated by the values of inhumanity and violence" is how Hugo Slim sums up the nature of the challenges faced by humanitarian activity (1997: 343). The fact that many players continue to disregard or be unaware of international humanitarian law (IHL) and that they also target and use relief groups and their resources to enhance their war operations presents even more challenges for humanitarians trying to provide aid to civilians. The likelihood of kidnapping, sexual assault, or murder occurring to aid workers is rising, as seen by the situation in modern-day Afghanistan.

Because of these circumstances, there is a chance that the food and supplies provided by relief organizations might unintentionally contribute to the conflict's material support. As a result, a lot of humanitarians wonder if their efforts are making things worse or better. For example, when food sent to a community is also used—either willingly or unwillingly—to sustain soldiers, such information is taken into account by the parties involved in the battle. After saving some lives, humanitarian actors must consider if their aid may contribute to the continuation of a violent cycle. According to Mary Anderson (1999), assistance influences conflict through implicit ethical messages as well as resource transfers. She specifically names seven implicit ethical messages that aid workers must face if they are to "do no harm" and five "predictable" effects of assistance resources on conflict (Anderson 1999: 39). Resource transfers may happen in a variety of ways, including when fighters steal them and use them to bolster armies and purchase weaponry.

Additionally, when help replaces local resources, it influences and distorts local markets. Additionally, when aid benefits one group over another, its distributional effects alter intergroup interactions. Furthermore, help has the power to legitimate certain individuals while denying others and freeing up local resources to fuel conflict. Help delivery's implicit ethical messages support the relationship between power and weapons (authority) by working with or utilizing local militias, among other things. Additionally, Anderson contends that inter-agency rivalries lend credence to the notion that interpersonal cooperation is superfluous. More significantly, when aid workers make use of benefits that locals are denied—such as food, access to public transportation, and security—they are perceived as acting with impunity and as having a different (higher) value placed on their life than that of local employees (Anderson 1999: 59). Put simply, delivering aid in complex circumstances involves balancing the logistical and ethical challenges of assisting individuals who are in danger of significant injury with the job of relief personnel and agencies.

The emergence of intricate crises in the aftermath of the Cold War has led to much discourse and introspection among humanitarian organizations over their objectives and approaches. The most significant question to come out of this process is whether humanitarianism—as

traditionally defined by groups like the International Committee of the Red Cross—remains viable or if alleviating suffering necessitates assistance organizations to take part in more extensive social solutions to conflict. As previously said, the traditional understanding of humanitarian organizations' function is to provide relief to the afflicted based on standards that are unbiased, nonpartisan, and needs-based. The main goal is to alleviate suffering for all people, irrespective of the reason, based only on necessity, and impartially toward all parties involved in a dispute. Complex circumstances, however, have created the prospect that helping only results in the "well-fed dead" syndrome. Humanitarians who focus primarily on immediate aid neglect the possibility that victims' lives may be in danger later on in the war; as one beneficiary put it, "You save my life today, but for what tomorrow?" (Anderson 1998). It has been said that these assertions sparked the rise of the "new" humanitarianism.

In addition to being "human rights-based," "principled," and politically astute, new humanitarianism aims to bolster the forces that uphold peace and stability in developing countries (Fox 2011: 275). From this perspective, humanitarianism takes on a proactive role in enhancing human resources, promoting peace, resolving conflicts, and identifying sustainable ways to end suffering. Organizations such as Oxfam, for example, combine disaster relief and development in their initiatives. According to Barnett (2015), "new humanitarianism" may take several forms that extend beyond providing emergency relief. These forms may resemble post-conflict rebuilding and development, development aid, or even constructing accountable nations and democracy. Integrating a commitment to human rights as a basic legitimizing principle and as a useful objective of assistance distribution is at the heart of contemporary humanitarianism. The goals of relief organizations include both alleviating pain and defending the victims of complicated catastrophes human rights. It is argued that for humanitarianism to avoid becoming a part of the issue, it must join the solution rather than continuing to be "non-political," as it never has been. This should not come as too big of a surprise. After treating people's suffering in emergencies, it makes sense to investigate how such circumstances came to be and how they could be avoided going forward. It is expected of any devoted humanitarian that they will question if the help they offer will only be a band-aid solution to deeper issues. The overall result of these reflections, according to Michael Barnett, has been the politicization and institutionalization of humanitarianism in general as well as the emergence of two distinct categories of humanitarian organizations: the Wilsonian (Save the Children, Oxfam, World Vision) organization, which is dedicated to changing "political, economic, and cultural structures," and the Dunantist organization, which adheres to the traditional approach of impartiality, neutrality, and independence (Barnett 2015: 728). The result of this process has been the adoption of an "integrated" or "coherent" strategy for disaster relief.

According to de Torrente (2014), the goal of the integrated approach is to create and pursue a "comprehensive, durable, and just resolution of conflict." The Office of Humanitarian Affairs has been run by the UN since 1992 (OCHA 2018). According to OCHA (2018), it "has overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field" and "facilitates the work of operational agencies that deliver humanitarian assistance to populations and communities in need" (OCHA 2018). Coordinating UN and non-UN organizations and implementing a "coherent interagency response to humanitarian emergencies" are the two main responsibilities of OCHA. One may argue that the US and NATO wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 marked the pinnacle of integration. To foresee and address the anticipated humanitarian effects of the military operation, humanitarian non-governmental organizations were included in the planning stages in each of these situations.

Integration is not without its detractors, though, and instead of resolving the issues brought up in the 1990s, it has given rise to new moral dilemmas that the humanitarian conscience must confront. The central question is about the advantages and disadvantages of "politizing humanitarianism," or submitting aid to the "political ambitions of the international community" (de Torrente 2014: 3). This implies that humanitarian organizations are now part of a bigger picture that includes political objectives, rather than existing as independent actors focused on providing aid. This has therefore occasionally forced them to refuse aid or condition it on approval or suitability for state political objectives (see Fox 2011; Stockton 2012). As a result, rather than helping the poor, such assistance is now either withheld as a punishment or used as a reward for complying with rules or changing one's conduct. The military viewed humanitarian activities as basically a "force multiplier... an important part of our combat team" in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, which highlighted the flaws with the integrated method (Colin Powell, in Barnett 2015). This led to several outcomes, including linking assistance delivery to cooperation or intelligence gathering against the Taliban. "Pass on any information about Taliban, al Qaeda, and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces to have a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid," said one brochure that was dropped with aid (see de Torrente 2014: 67). According to traditional humanitarians, this kind of connection puts political objectives before of people's needs, which results in the loss of lives that could have been saved. The victims of battle are more clearly sacrificed to achieve longer-term objectives.

As a result of the integration of humanitarian work with the rhetoric around human rights, humanitarians may now be involved in or advocate armed intervention—a practice known as military humanitarianism, according to Chandler (2011)—when acting in the name of humanitarian intervention. The first example of this kind of intervention was perhaps in Somalia in 1992 when the US led a UN force to permit the provision of famine aid. NATO's 1999–2000 action in Kosovo was mostly carried out for humanitarian reasons, but in this

instance, to stop a crime against humanity. However, the uprooting of Kosovo Albanians also created a significant humanitarian crisis. The basic claim is that there are situations when a humanitarian emergency necessitates military intervention. In this instance, using military action to stop or prevent human suffering is morally right.

The concept of governments having humanitarian obligations is increasingly ingrained in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm (ICISS 2011). According to this theory, nations and the international community must shield people who are at risk from preventable harm, such as crimes against humanity and genocide. This duty includes, but is not restricted to, the obligation to use force when necessary. The use of military action invariably results in unwarranted suffering for both the "guilty" and, most likely, the innocent or non-combatant civilians. This presents an evident moral dilemma. The paradox of military intervention for humanitarian reasons is that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may have to provide care for both the victims of the violence that prompted the military action and the victims of the intervention itself. In this regard, military action is both likely to contribute to and alleviate human suffering.

For example, a lot of individuals contend that the humanitarian catastrophe that resulted in the deportation of Kosovo Albanians was brought on by NATO's engagement in Kosovo. If this is true, there is a strong case that the military intervention was unnecessary since it resulted in a second, perhaps more serious humanitarian crisis. However, this is only true if the intervention led to the deportation of the Albanians from Kosovo and if the situation that followed was noticeably greater than it might have been in any other circumstance. The problems with humanitarian intervention are a natural extension of the problems with humanitarianism. Is it feasible to alleviate suffering by causing harm—including death—or to accept pain as an unintentional consequence? Many people are searching for a new compass or "moral banner" in light of the problems facing conventional humanitarianism and the expenses associated with the new humanitarianism (Fox 2011). After examining these problems and conundrums, the rest of the paper makes the case that a Kantian interpretation of the mutual aid doctrine can serve as both a moral "banner" and a more satisfying moral basis for the humanitarian endeavor, thereby mitigating some of the drawbacks associated with both new humanitarianism and classical human rights.

Defining and Justifying Humanitarianism

As it happens, it is not easy to define humanitarianism precisely. Usually, the term is used synonymously with a similarly ill-defined idea of humanity and/or the work of humanitarians or humanitarian groups like the ICRC. Humanitarianism, in the words of former ICRC Director Jean Pictet (1979), "is a doctrine which aims at the happiness of the human species, or, if one prefers, it is the attitude of mankind towards mankind, on a basis of universality." Pictet claimed that humanitarianism began with the fundamental concept of humanity. According to Gall and O'Hagan (2013), "the belief that the sole moral obligation

of humankind is the improvement of human welfare" (p. 4), humanism is an ethical and political mission that is connected to humanitarianism. Humanism was linked to the idea of human perfection by the first humanitarians. Humanism sprang from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and humanitarianism represented the idea that suffering might not only be lessened but also eliminated. More precisely, as a humanistic endeavor, humanitarianism aims to attend to the needs of every person who is suffering from preventable inadequacies in meeting their fundamental requirements. Simply put, humanitarianism is the belief that everyone has a moral obligation to alleviate the suffering of others.

Although the development of a secular humanitarian theory in the 19th and 20th centuries was largely attributed to humanism, it is important to acknowledge the significance of religious and theological grounds for global sympathy. Early humanitarian groups, including the antislavery campaign, were influenced by Christian ideas of compassion and Quaker sensibilities toward suffering and violence. Islam and other religions also contain comparable concepts of charity and mutual help, which is why the Red Crescent Society was founded. Thus, humanitarianism has both religious and secular roots, much as cosmopolitanism in general. Most crucially, starting from the universal capacity for suffering, humanitarianism is cosmopolitan in breadth and goal, but not necessarily liberal in justification.

Naturally, the goal of the ICRC and related organizations is not to put an end to all human suffering. They do not intend to completely alter the human situation. Rather, they see humanitarianism as the more constrained act of ministering to the immediate, preventable suffering of others. "Prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found" is the ICRC's statement about the humanitarian objective. Its goals are to uphold human dignity and to safeguard life and health (see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 16). In actuality, aid, typically emergency aid, has been the traditional humanitarian ideology. According to Pictet (1979), the Red Cross interprets this as "protecting human beings in the event of conflict and relieving their suffering." This speaks to the efforts made to meet the needs of those who are in circumstances that put them at risk of hunger, homelessness, displacement, and other hardships. While partially driven by a transformational goal to eradicate needless suffering in general, classical humanitarianism seeks to temporarily alleviate human suffering. The main goal of humanitarianism has been to lessen suffering brought on by armed conflict or natural calamities. Humanitarianism is "concerned with the immediate relief or assistance and is concerned with the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters, not necessarily in war zones and not necessarily connected with explicit violations of human rights," according to Ramsbottom and Woodhouse (1996: 12). The fundamental moral presumption is that no one should have to endure needless suffering from preventable causes when there is help available to lessen or completely stop that suffering.

Nonetheless, the reduction of suffering might be a more ambitious aim to put an end to needless suffering in general, or it can be the immediate purpose of relief or aid. Pictet's definition of humanitarianism highlights the concept's dual, perhaps conflicting definition as a justice and charity (philanthropic) tenet. Pictet asserted:

> Modern humanitarianism is an advanced and rational form of charity and justice. It is not only directed to fighting against the suffering of a given moment and of helping particular individuals, for it also has more positive aims, designed to attain the greatest possible measure of happiness for the greatest number of people. In addition, humanitarianism does not only act to cure but also to prevent suffering, to fight against evils, even over a long term of time (1979).

There is conflict within humanitarianism due to Pictet's identification of the two motivations of obligation (justice) and charity. There is little doubt that this conflict is what separates the Wilsonian and Dunantist schools of thought. The point of contention is whether and to what degree alleviating suffering calls for changing the suffering's surroundings in addition to providing momentary respite.

The ICRC's goals of providing care for war victims, changing war policies, and eliminating war are all infused with justice and charity. On the one hand, the notion that war victims ought to get care regardless of their involvement in the fighting is, historically speaking, a revolutionary philosophy that reveals a broad morality uncommon in human history. The development of international humanitarian law (IHL), a body of legislation that establishes guidelines for conflict, particularly about the treatment of captives and non-combatants, as well as limitations on state tactics during hostilities, is indicative of humanitarianism's transformational aim. International humanitarian law, as stated by the ICRC (2017), aims to "restrict the means and methods of warfare, protect persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities, and limit the effects of armed conflict." In these situations, humanitarianism unmistakably aims to change state behavior to lessen suffering among people and assist those injured by a state's violent conduct.

The conflict between the ideas of justice and humanitarianism is shown in the discussion of the link between humanitarianism and human rights. The concept of humanitarianism help does not completely capture the revolutionary political objective that the ideology of human rights offers. Since humanitarianism is mostly apolitical, it is not as contentious in countries affected by natural calamities. However, more important ethical issues surface when the humanitarian obligation goes beyond mitigating the impacts of conflict. The humanitarian argument specifically asserts that all political allegiances, secular commitments, or military objectives are subordinated to the moral need to offer relief. Although this assertion is based on a humanist concept, it is now more frequently stated in terms of human rights but is also reflected in international humanitarian law.

Humanitarianism as Charity

The difficulties that arise while providing humanitarian help and the compromises that must be made highlight the conflict between the principle's goals of achieving justice and social reform and the alleviation of victims' pain (charity). It is important to recognize that a large number of issues encountered by professionals in the industry are a result of this fundamental uncertainty. Because of this, resolving these conflicts necessitates considering the nature of these concepts and their connection. Jean Pictet defined charity as a type of altruism motivated by pity, as opposed to only giving alms, and he associated charity with Christian love:

> Charity is an effort demanded of us, either inwardly or from the outside, which becomes a second nature, to relieve and put an end to the sufferings of others . . . Charity is above all an expression of Christian morality and is synonymous with love for one's neighbour . . . we are speaking of altruistic and disinterested love, which can be required of us, which calls for a certain degree of self- control, a love which is extended even to our enemies . . . Pity is one of the driving forces of charity . . . that stirring of the soul which makes one responsive to the distress of others. (Pictet, 1979).

For many people, charity serves as a powerful source of motivation since it embodies unselfish generosity and empathy for the suffering of others. Many good deeds have been performed by people who are driven by love and are prepared to perform charitable deeds to assist others who are in need. Humanitarianism, like charity, is often regarded to be an expression of virtue, of right and wrong, and of personal conscience. It may be viewed as a charity, which is the wealthy realizing that helping the less fortunate is a good thing. It is evident that altruism, more than any feeling of moral obligation, has influenced the development of IHL and the ICRC. The ICRC and other organizations can maintain their nonpolitical status in part because of the concept of charity. Humanitarians might argue that helping the victims "does not constitute interference in the conflict itself" because their actions are portrayed as altruistic (Gall and O'Hagan 2013: 12).

It is also evident that giving to charity does not always result in societal change. Additionally, the concept of charity has some drawbacks for a universalist and cosmopolitan ideology, chief among them being the implicit and accepted degree of disparity between donor and recipient. The underlying ethical signals Anderson (1999) identified—that of impunity and inequality—are evident and may have their origins in this reasoning. It is simpler to provide assistance providers preferential treatment when the receivers are viewed as victims. Helpers are doing a fantastic job of assisting others when they do not have to, thus they should be compensated or awarded for their efforts. Furthermore, the assistance providers believe they have the right to control resources and are free to "use them for personal purposes and

pleasure" (Anderson 1999: 57). After all, it is "their" help to provide. The point is made even more strongly when it comes to the disparate laws that are in place for local and foreign employees, such as those about radios, cars, and pay, and, most importantly, the evacuation of foreign employees. Local employees have frequently been abandoned or given less importance during evacuation than material things. Inequality is the "implicit ethical message," as Anderson (1999: 58) correctly points out.

Charity invariably increases the risk of inequality between the two parties since it is eventually viewed as a gift from the giver to the recipient. Aid is a gift to someone who is in need, thus giving it to them is certain to make the donor feel superior since they are in a position to offer, and the receiver feels inferior because they have to accept it. The provider has authority over the receiver, and that authority includes the right to withhold help if the recipient shows insufficient gratitude. The question of why the contribution was required in the first place is brought up by charity. Maybe the better provider should be kind to the recipients because they are by nature unable to assist themselves. Hugo Slim contends that historically, "The fact that the gift was necessary seemed to justify the "fact" that these people were not fully human "like us" (2012: 11) in the context of charitable giving between Europeans and non-Europeans (because they were incapable of providing for themselves). Put another way, the need for charity resulted from intrinsic inequality—not from external circumstances, but rather from personal traits and skills. When someone gives them charity, they should accept it with gratitude and humility; they should not beg for more or different kinds of help. Slim claims that by framing "the moral case in favor of those suffering war and disaster... in terms of such people's extraordinary and immediate "needs", their pitiful state and their inherent miserable righteousness as "victims", international NGOs and UN humanitarian organizations, both past and present, have exacerbated this inequality (2012: 6). Stated differently, getting charity implies that your life has been drastically diminished to the point that you are reduced to a victim, which accounts for the widespread sense of loss of dignity experienced by persons who perceive themselves as "reduced to charity." The idea of charity often evokes the adage "beggars cannot be choosers." Giving to charity perpetuates the notion that those who receive it are helpless by nature to take care of themselves, satisfy their own needs, or alter their situation. The concept that people are the subjects of their existence and equal worth to their donors is thus undermined by philanthropy (Slim 2012: 6). The provision of care for or "protection" of suffering animals and charitable giving to the underprivileged are similar in this regard.

At its worst, generosity prioritizes the provider over the recipient and disregards the latter's interests. Ignoring this can have life-threatening consequences in complex emergencies and may reduce efficacy. The *moral* obligation only sometimes translates into success, but it can spark the kind of introspection lacking from a philanthropic emphasis on the donor. Consider the practice of providing food help during famines; frequently, the receiver is not suitable for

such aid. There might be better courses of action than delivering wheat to a society accustomed to a diet high in rice, for example. One may argue that a large portion of official development aid, which is frequently adapted to the demands of the donor state, is influenced by the idea of help as a charity—that is, as something nice to do but not ethically obligatory. Until the 1990s, for example, official US policy on USAID food aid stated that the goals of food aid, in addition to humanitarian concerns, should include "the development of export markets, the containment of communism, and the reward to loyal allies" (Neumayer 2015: 395; Clapp 2015). It may be argued that when the motivation comes from the giver's urge to do good (charity) rather than the true needs of the receivers, this kind of misdirected effort is more likely.

This feature of philanthropic action has the most significant effect in that it diverts attention away from more fundamental political and social problems of causality and accountability in favor of instant alleviation. Charity takes a piecemeal approach and is not conducive to solving problems. "A system of "good acts" can serve as a smooth gloss over more structural violations and injustices," claims Slim (2012: 5). Charity, therefore, is an untrustworthy and ultimately insufficient means of directing one's actions. These restrictions point to a possible explanation for why more people are starting to associate humanitarian activity and objectives with the language of universal human rights or the humanitarian imperative. The next section goes over these.

Humanitarianism as Rights Work

Part of the issues with traditional humanitarianism's neutrality stems from its origins as a non-political charitable movement. Therefore, the idea of charity is rejected by the new humanitarianism in favor of the idea of human rights. The language of international ethics is centered on human rights, as several writers have observed, and an increasing number of actors are appealing to a global consciousness of rights and using the concept of a right as a tool to further their goals. The benefit of a human rights approach, according to its proponents, is that it grounds humanitarian action in international law and offers a distinct moral framework and set of principles. Humanitarians might thus assert that international law upholds and defends their ideals and that governments and other actors must acknowledge and respect this law. This has the benefit of clearly defining the goals and justifications for humanitarian aid work for both the recipients and the suppliers. To borrow Hugo Slim's words:

> An ideology of charity and philanthropy alone could simply demand pity, compassion and care. But the moment one uses rights-talk, one becomes explicitly in a demand for responsible politics, law and justice. Where this demand is rejected in war becomes the point at which the struggle for humanitarian action to protect these rights is begun (2012: 7).

The language of rights is consequently explicitly political, referring as it does to the relationship between individuals and their state. Since fundamental human rights are the bar that no one should be permitted to go below, all political structures and conflicting parties are nonetheless obligated to keep people from falling below that minimal bar. Humanitarians are directly engaging in politics when they speak in terms of rights. Because it is a demand to limit and restrain governmental action, humanitarianism in defense of rights thus becomes a political intervention. In addition, humanitarianism is steered toward the transformational language of justice rather than charity by appealing to the language of rights. Since the concept of human rights is a component of a political endeavor to create a world where these rights are implemented, it has the potential to change society. The greatest benefit of using language related to rights instead of charity is that it alters the way that recipients are seen and even the nature of the "gift" that is given: "Rights make people more powerful as legitimate claimants rather than unfortunate beggars; they dignify rather than victimize or patronize people." According to Slim (2012: 16), "rights reveal all people as moral, political, and legal equals." Humanitarianism is used in this context to fulfill or restore commitments related to human rights. NGOs increasingly see themselves as offering humanitarian protection or safeguarding people's rights in addition to their safety. Individuals assert their entitlement to the protection of their rights, not only "relief," as right bearers. The terminology of help has given way to that of humanitarian protection as a symptom of this. The great philanthropic term of the Victorian poor laws and the defining term of Britain's ancient charity laws, "relief," changed to "assistance" in the 1990s and is currently combined with real-world legal concepts of rights in war and asylum to form a new umbrella term known as "humanitarian protection," as noted by Slim. (2012: 14).

Since humanitarianism is typically viewed as existing "above the contests for power and interest," several NGOs have expressed concern about the concept that it is overly tied to human rights (Gall and O'Hagan 2013: 3). Humanitarian assistance distribution that adopts a lexicon of rights runs the risk of politicizing what was previously thought to be non-political. This poses a risk in that it can make it more difficult for humanitarians to reach conflict areas and do their tasks. On the other hand, proponents of a rights-based approach clarify that remaining neutral in disputes does not equate to being non-political. Humanitarianism has always involved significant politics. Since their inception, organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have been compelled to engage in the politically charged endeavor of securing humanitarian space for their operations and persuading nations to uphold the human rights of noncombatants. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was founded not just to relieve suffering but also to persuade governments to create humanitarian regulations permitting relief to victims of conflict. These principles are now enshrined in international humanitarian law after being codified. Humanitarianism is "a project that is actively engaged with challenging those in power to limit violence and protect

civilians," according to Slim (2012: 2). Furthermore, humanitarianism immediately contests the state's claim to exclusive national sovereignty over its citizens and their allegiances since it evokes the idea of a global community of humankind, humanity itself.

The more significant shortcomings of the rights-based approach have been brought to light by the current problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the African Great Lakes area. Although the concept of human rights has its roots in many ethical traditions, it has come to be associated with consequentialist principles within the framework of post-Cold War humanitarianism. Therefore, as Fox asserts, "The human rights approach means the elevation of political rights over basic needs," as seen by the way the rights-based approach is applied in humanitarian conflicts (Fox 2011: 283). For example, in Afghanistan, "when the Taliban issued their edicts restricting women's rights, several aid agencies suspended humanitarian aid programs." Here, it was evident that these organizations prioritized human rights concerns over the needs of the Afghan people (Fox 2011: 283). The most contentious aspect of this is that it has meant sacrificing "now" life preservation in favor of potentially longer-term life preservation through the development of workable political solutions. The camps for refugees in Zaire, which is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provided the clearest illustration of this between 1994 and 1997. Following the successful relief operations to assist people escaping the genocide in Rwanda, Hutus who were leaving their homeland were pouring into the camps out of fear of reprisals from the newly elected government. The "genocidaires" subsequently proceeded to commit acts of violence and intimidation against the campers. The camps were eventually overrun by the Rwandan army, which was supported by several NGOs, and hundreds of thousands of people were driven out. While many of them were returned to Rwanda by force, others were not, and they were left to their destiny in neighboring nations like Zaire. To put it succinctly, the humanitarian effort was halted to enable a political settlement—which, however, never materialized—according to Stockton (2012) and Fox (2011).

In the end, these kinds of shortcomings include sacrificing the fundamental humanitarian need to put an end to suffering in favor of the powerful political objectives. Seeking political solutions is undoubtedly vital to attaining the longer-term objectives of putting an end to suffering and establishing peace, but this does not mean that inactivity today is acceptable. Thus, the politics of emergency relief has caused far more significant issues for humanitarians than it did to help solve the crises that faced them in the early 1990s. This has led to the division of classic Dunantist NGOs from transformational Wilsonian NGOs, as we have seen. As a result, as many have pointed out, there is still a need to provide humanitarian activities with a more morally sound basis to enable the requirements for giving and receiving help. Kantian ethics is identified as offering a morally sound foundation for humanitarianism that may guide both policy and practice in the next section.

Mutual Aid: A Humanitarian Imperative?

The idea of a humanitarian imperative has developed in tandem with the usage of the rhetoric of rights. The humanitarian imperative is defined as "the conviction that all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to protection and assistance" by the *Sphere Handbook* (1996: 16). The moral duty to help is emphasized by the notion that humanitarians are carrying out a duty. The imperative discourse relates to positive responsibilities, whereas the rights-based discourse solely emphasizes negative duties, such as avoiding violating rights. Imperatives are unconditional and apply regardless of results or repercussions since they are categorical. The language of imperatives is different from consequentialist ethical frameworks, which would link or condition assistance to some previous political outcome or aim, such as peace, democracy, or openness. Rather, the humanitarian imperative targets everyone impacted by a war or emergency as a means of achieving their own goals. This advances Pictet's interpretation of humanitarianism as almsgiving while maintaining the universality of a humanist notion connected to some kind of justice, that is, what is due to all. Humanitarians are asserting something that may be considered to go beyond human rights to the extent that they employ imperatives, as the humanitarian imperative outlines a universal need to help people in need. Although the concept of an imperative is still poorly understood, it offers us a different perspective from the discourses on rights and charity.

The fundamental tenet of traditional humanitarianism is that those who are unable to help themselves have a duty to help others, and that obligation is largely motivated by need and a shared humanity. Although this is commonly referred to as "good samaritanism," the philosophical name for it is "mutual aid," or occasionally "beneficence" (though some distinguish between the two). This is only one's moral obligation to assist others in need, provided that doing so does not cause harm to oneself. Mutual assistance is not the same as supererogation or charity—doing good but not having a responsibility. Most people agree that all humans owe each other mutual help. When one actor can help another who is suffering or in need—typically in great need—mutual aid is necessary. Thus, in times of famine, we consider that those who have much owe those who have little or nothing reciprocal help. It would be morally and ethically incorrect to refuse assistance in this case. According to the mutual aid theory, everyone must help one another when they are in need. That being said, there is no obligation to assist those who are not in need. Since mutual help refers to what each actor owes to the other rather than to a fundamental organizing principle of society, it differs from the responsibilities of justice as conceived by Rawlsians. Many pluralist and communitarian anti-cosmopolitans promote mutual help.

The Kantian legacy of cosmopolitanism is closely associated with the language of imperatives. The global idea of mutual help comes from Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI). According to Kant, there are universal obligations to uphold the concepts of reciprocal help,

maintaining one's word, forbidding suicide, and developing one's gifts (Guyer 2017). Since each of them was based on the CI and cared about the status of the others as goals, it was a moral precept. Assisting those in need when they are unable to assist themselves is not only right but also ethically imperative. For this reason, according to Barbara Herman, "the point of the help we may be required to give, in both emergency and normal cases, is not to alleviate suffering per se, but to alleviate suffering because of what suffering signifies for beings like us" (Herman 2011: 244). This is because of the Kantian account of beneficence. For creatures such as ourselves, pain denotes a certain type of injury, namely the forfeiture of autonomy and the inability to create a life for oneself. A person experiencing extreme deprivation has both the more commonplace bodily pains and sadness in addition to the loss of this capacity. As a result, the obligation to help is a moral obligation to uphold:

> the other's active and successful pursuit of his self-defined goals. I promote another's well-being or happiness by supporting the conditions for his pursuit of ends. That is, what I have a duty to do is to contribute to the meeting of his true needs when that is not within his power (Herman 1984: 601).

Kant therefore believed that mutual help was based on the awareness of what was owed to sensible beings—ends in themselves—rather than on suffering per se. To understand the relevance of this idea for humanitarianism, it is important to expand on it here. Although the discourse on rights is focused on an individual's position as a means to an end, it falls short of providing a sufficient justification for why I should assist you in realizing your rights (O'Neill 1986). Beyond simple empathy, the Kantian explanation aims to give a justification for a legally mandated responsibility of care:

> As a person's true needs are those which must be met if he is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end- setting agent, respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others (their capacity to set and act from ends) when they are unable to do so without help (Herman 1984: 597).

This obligation can be compared to the concepts of charity and rights discourse. According to Kant, those who receive charity are not considered as means to a goal and are thought to lack agency and the ability to make decisions for themselves.

Mutual aid, according to Kant, is an obligation to help that is positive and independent of any causal link. Mutual help is still an imperfect obligation, according to Kant. The responsibilities that are perfect and that are never appropriate to neglect. There are some responsibilities, such as imperfect duties, from which we are exempt. Since we cannot be expected to help others to the degree that we suffer, mutual aid is an imperfect responsibility. According to Herman, Kant's definition of mutual assistance is as follows:

"The goal of mutual aid is not achieved if providing aid compromises the giver's life activity" (It is not a sacrifice, but an obligation of mutual help). What is required to maintain one's human existence is not interfered with by the norms of beneficence (1984: 598). Giving till we can offer no more would be the ideal responsibility of care.

While recognizing the moral obligation of mutual help necessitates moral judgment processes, it is so. Put otherwise, this imperfect obligation means that it is not always obvious what I should do or how much help I should provide. The relationship between means and objectives, or the mode of delivering help, is precisely where the Kantian emphasis on the obligation of mutual aid focuses. When it comes to meeting another person's needs as ends in and of themselves, the duty of beneficence specifically entails the following:

> The *how* of needs response, that is, the manner in which one meets another's needs, is no less than crucial to the dignity of the agent. If needs are met in a way that demeans the one in need, . . . her dignity and worth will in no sense be protected, let alone further fostered. Agents can be harmed by the incivility and humiliation of insulting care (Miller 2012: 158).

Humanitarianism has to understand the categorical imperative to address this. To fulfill our obligation of mutual aid, we must assist others in bettering themselves as well as keeping them alive. The idea of "not harm," as expressed by Mary Anderson (1999), is consistent with this kind of Kantian practice. Her research suggests that for help to be effective and have positive effects, beneficiaries must be treated as equals rather than as just "victims." Therefore, most users of humanitarian aid are not members of the "deserving poor" who are incapable of helping themselves, but rather those who suffer from dire circumstances and social system failures but otherwise possess human talents and abilities.

The Kantian account could be interpreted to mean that the establishment of human rights organizations, a strong political culture, or military action are means to an end, whereas others are seen as means to an end in and of themselves. This could lead to a consequentialist perspective. However, this misinterprets what mutual help means in this situation if it implies ignoring one's obligation to assist others "here now," that is, during this emergency. Mutual help is a statement of the CI that prohibits the needless sacrifice of one person's necessities for another. For example, requiring users of emergency relief to fulfill political goals would turn them into tools, which is inconsistent with mutual aid and the CI.

The idea that an assistance worker has superior knowledge and understands the other person's requirements better than they do might be reinforced by the reference to satisfying the other person's true needs. But this kind of reading is countered by the acknowledgment of the other as an end in and of themselves, as part of what makes a moral agent an end is their ability to recognize their own needs. As noted by Sarah Miller:

> The duty of beneficence commands that I promote others' happiness in accordance with their self- determined, self-defined ends (hence avoiding paternalistic practices). As Kant notes, 'I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness . . . thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness' (2015: 154).

Therefore, as Herman states, "the acquisition of dispositions of appropriate helpfulness (attitudes of humility and respect; wariness about paternalism and dependence, and so forth)" is necessary to fulfill the obligation of mutual aid. (2011: 245). The argument put forward by Edkins and others (1996, 2013) that humanitarianism reproduces the logic of the "bare life," in which individuals are reduced to simple bodies that need to be fed, watched after, or ruled, may also be addressed with the aid of the Kantian idea of mutual aid. Humanitarianism dehumanizes people in this way. The fundamental premise of Edkins's argument is that when we engage those receiving help as bodies and respond to their needs just as suffering, we run the risk of forgetting or undervaluing their culture, identity, humanity, and agency.

Thus, humanitarian assistance workers are reminded by Kantian beneficence to exercise caution and compassion in the performance of their duties. Aid professionals who give care also acknowledge the agency and abilities of the people under their supervision. It is noteworthy that the "ethics of care" also serve humanitarianism effectively (see Robinson 1999; Held 2016; S. Miller 2015).

In summary, the Kantian understanding of the duty of mutual help establishes a moral basis for humanitarian assistance by placing the responsibility of providing for the basic (or what Miller refers to as the "constitutive") needs of those who are unable to fend for themselves at the center of moral concern. It is specifically directed towards individuals in "emergency" scenarios and, although rigorous, has a restricted reach. Since mutual help is an individual moral obligation rather than a function of the political or social structures that could actualize a person's rights, it differs from justice in this regard. Assisting those in need right away is a less aspirational personal responsibility.

Although it does entail a negative responsibility not to contribute to anything that would hinder the accomplishment of these things, "emergency aid," or complex emergencies, does not create an obligation to tackle all the issues of development, peace-building, or human rights. It does, however, mandate that to fulfill the obligation of mutual aid, the beneficiaries must be recognized as individuals who need assistance in regaining their agency, rather than just as recipients or victims. Those who experience a brief loss of agency are the recipients of emergency humanitarian help.

Mutual help is a responsibility that aligns with the principles of traditional humanitarianism, but it gives those principles a new foundation that centers on the needs of the beneficiaries.

As political objectives cannot be sacrificed for help, it protects against the perils of political humanitarianism. But it also stays away from charity paternalism. Mutual help is unable to address the issue of the "well-fed dead" or offer guidelines for evaluating the effects of humanitarian efforts once the provision of emergency support has ceased. Mutual assistance serves as a reminder of this obligation's limitations and beneficence's bounds. Hence, help does not fulfill its moral requirements if it keeps people alive but instead replaces their self-sufficiency or maintains them in "welfare" dependent relationships. On the other hand, if aid keeps people alive and well when they would otherwise die, the commitment is satisfied.

Regarding the "well-fed dead," one must protect others from harm, but one is not obligated to put a stop to the fight or work toward establishing peace. It is a matter of fairness that society bears the responsibility for these. According to this narrative of mutual help, NGOs participating in the more aspirational "new humanitarianism" are trying to become agents of justice rather than merely providing relief. Mutual aid obligations are not the same as duties of justice. The obligations of justice start when mutual help ends. States or societies collectively bear the primary responsibility for upholding the rule of law. States are therefore obligated to protect, prevent, and lessen needless and preventable suffering on behalf of their subjects and people. While states are unable to stop all suffering, they can work to lessen and stop it. This is under the purview of justice. These organizations only must provide humanitarianism, or mutual help, in cases where the state has failed to defend its population (Wenar 2017).

Conclusion

Humanitarianism is an ideology that values human life highly and advocates treating others with kindness and assistance to alleviate suffering and improve human circumstances for moral, altruistic, and affective reasons. Although humanitarian efforts on a local and national level have a long history, specialists in international politics typically trace the formation of global humanitarian impulses back to the 1800s. The establishment of the International Red Cross in 1863 is seen as a significant turning point in the history of humanitarianism globally. The scope of humanitarianism has evolved in tandem with shifting conceptions of what makes a "human" and whose lives are worth it.

Humanitarianism addresses the issue of what is required to have a meaningful life. Humanitarianism emphasizes that people must alleviate suffering when it occurs. Thus, the essential tenet of cosmopolitanism is humanitarianism. Humanism uses suffering as a point of reference, to begin with the essentials of existence. To a certain extent, it recognizes the social and biological unity of human society. The most important insight to come out of the humanitarian debate of the 1990s is the necessity to strike a balance between this worry and an appreciation of the agency of those getting aid or protection. The boundaries of humanitarian actions point to the need for the moral significance of individual agency—the cornerstone of the Kantian cosmopolitan tradition—to be acknowledged. As soon as we

acknowledge that people suffer and that we must assist, we must also acknowledge that, in carrying out our duties, we must respect people's moral standing as independent beings who are ends in and of themselves.

Anti-cosmopolitans have defended this type of general mutual aid concept as being in line with communitarian ideals. One advantage of the humanitarian principle is that it does not require a complex, shared conception of justice or what it means to live a decent life. Theoretically, there is no shared cultural need to ease suffering during crises; yet, cultural conceptions, paternalism, bigotry, or ignorance may taint the relief effort. Essentially, humanism promotes empathy for strangers and a wide feeling of shared humanity rather than a complete grasp of citizenship and a shared political or cultural identity.

We do not need to think of ourselves as a single, cohesive global community. It rejects both a global Rawlsian perspective and a disdain for one's social duties. Humanitarianism, above all, is the will to take action motivated by the recognition and identification of another person's suffering, regardless of that person's identity or affiliation with a certain organization. It describes the equality principle in terms of empathy, compassion, and consideration for other people's needs. Minimal humanitarianism addresses the issues of requirements and conditions for a happy life. For these reasons, communitarians and pluralists may and should endorse the idea of mutual aid. But anti-cosmopolitanism hasn't provided any guidance on applying or comprehending the idea of mutual aid.

The Kantian account of beneficence offers some assistance, as the previous debate has shown. As a result, without cosmopolitanism, even "communitarian" ethics are deficient since without it, the obligation of mutual aid cannot be established. The act of providing emergency humanitarian aid, which is motivated by a humanitarian ethic yet stays within reasonable limitations, is the most visible and common kind of humanitarianism. Beyond this fundamental definition of humanitarianism, there is a more developed cosmopolitan ethos that speaks to a more universal duty to relieve suffering wherever it is found, not just in terrible or urgent circumstances. The goal of true humanitarianism is to eradicate poverty and hunger anywhere they exist. However, because mutual aid is limited in scope and is associated with certain practices, it is insufficient globally. Instead, a more comprehensive attempt to reduce suffering requires a commitment to justice and the restructuring of social institutions.

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